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Kentucky Modernizes the Law
of Chattel Security
By Homm KR piu.*
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code appears to be
more revolutionary than the other articles of the Code because
it is a new uniform act instead of a modernization of older uni-
form acts, as is the case for most of the other articles. How-
ever, Article 9 contains little innovation. When I had the pleasure
of delivering lectures on the Code in the first two states to enact
it, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, I was able to say that the
Code simply represented the modernization and the rational-
ization of certain statutes which were a fragmentary codification
of the law of chattel security, namely, the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, factors' lien laws,
and statutes governing the perfection of assignments of accounts
receivable. Both Massachusetts and Pennsylvania had laws in
all of those fields, and the Code simply represented an attempt
to combine all the forms of chattel security legislation into a
rational picture.
In Kentucky it is still true that the Code deals with forms of
chattel security which are perfectly familiar to every American
lawyer. This Code is not the introduction of Roman law nor the
law of a strange planet. Nothing in it will be unfamiliar to Ken-
tucky lawyers once they master the terminology. It is a fact,
however, that Kentucky has been behind most American juris-
dictions in fragmentary codification of the newly developed law
of chattel security. It has had no adequate treatment of condi-
tional sales, except to subject them generally to chattel mort-
gage law. It has not had a trust receipt statute or a factors' lien
statute or an accounts receivable statute. Therefore, for Ken-
* A.B., J.D., University of Michigan; Assistant General Counsel, C.I.T.
Financial Corporation, New York City; Formerly Visiting Lecturer, Yale Law
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tucky it may truly be said that in the field of chattel security,
the Code represents one giant step into the twentieth century.
To express the foregoing in somewhat more detail, it is use-
ful to stop and make articulate some of the consequences of facts
which everyone knows; namely, that prior to the growth of as-
sembly line production of automobiles there were few types of
wealth embodied in tangible personal property. Apart from
livestock and an occasional piano or set of books, there are al-
most no nineteenth century cases on the law of tangible per-
sonal property. It is only in this century that wealth and .our
higher standard of living have found expression in the auto-
mobile; household chattels such as the refrigerator and the wash-
ing machine; machinery for mass production; equipment for
service stations, supermarkets and the like; and equipment for
service establishments like beauty parlors, tailor shops and
laundries.
All of these types of chattel represent the embodiment of
long-term use values. They are "big ticket items." They require
a single decision to expend a large amount of money for satis-
factions that will come back over a period of years. In order that
mass distribution of them could be possible, it was necessary to
find business mechanisms under which payment could be geared
to a time schedule somewhat paralleling the enjoyment of the
use values. The answer, of course, was the installment sale or
installment loan. For this kind of business problem, the legal
mechanisms of the nineteenth century were quite inadequate.
Nineteenth-century chattel law was essentially chattel mort-
gage law, which paralleled the static and rigid conceptions ap-
plicable to real estate mortgage law. Kentucky was actually
somewhat behind other states in creating a modem chattel
mortgage law, and obtained it only in the 1930's in connection
with the push of the federal farm lending agencies to obtain
state laws that would give them adequate security.1
There remained, however, vast areas of modem chattel
transactions for which Kentucky had provided no statutory
framework. The most obvious example is the retail installment
sale of automobiles or other chattels on credit, with title retained
by the seller or his assignee until payment. This key problem
1 Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 882.600-.780(1959) (hereinafter cited as KlRS).
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of modem distribution resulted in the drafting by the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws of a Uniform Conditional Sales
Act 2 which was adopted in about ten states, and comparable
legislation in numerous other states. As a generalization, condi-
tional sales statutes require less in the way of formalities, such as
witnessing, acknowledgements, and affidavits, than do chattel
mortgage laws. In many states the conditional sale originally did
not have to be filed, although more recent statutes have moved
away from that kind of thinking in recognition of the fact that
title retention created hazards for creditors and subsequent
purchasers exactly comparable to 'the situation under chattel
mortgages. There was also a general tendency toward shortening
and simplification of conditional-sale documents, as compared
to the traditional form of chattel mortgages. Kentucky, however,
never adopted a comprehensive statute for conditional sales
and they remained subject generally to the law applicable to
chattel mortgages.3
As installment selling grew in importance, and banks and
other institutions came to purchase the contracts from sellers,
many states enacted retail installment selling acts to control the
time price differential charged for the credit extension; to re-
quire disclosures as to these charges and insurance charges in
connection with the transaction; and to regulate other aspects
of the transaction such as extension, rewrites and prepayments.
This tendency has received some recognition in Kentucky in
the passage of a Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act,a
although the Kentucky statute does not go as far as some. It omits
licensing of finance companies 'and does not apply to goods
other than motor vehicles.
Similarly, a demand arose for certificate-of-title laws for auto-
mobiles, which would both help in controlling the theft problem
and also serve as the device for filing and recording transfers of
title or liens or both. The automobile is a special kind of chattel
which is very mobile and thousands of cars fall into very few
types, so that there are hundreds of cars that would appear identi-
cal except for serial numbers. The.need for this kind of spec-
2 2 Uniform Laws Annotated.
3 See Munz v. National Bond & Investment Co., 243 Ky. 293, 47 S.W.2d 1055
(1932); GMAC v. Sharp Motor Sales Co., 233 Ky. 240, 25 S.W.2d 405 (1930).
3a KRS §§ 190.090-.140.
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ialized legislation was again felt late in Kentucky. Finally, in
1958 it led to the passage of an act in Kentucky which was
not modelled after the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of
Title and Anti-Theft Act4 recently promulgated by the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws nor on any of the thirty-odd state
laws already existing. It is a statute of fragmentary nature
unintegrated with the Code, which leaves more problems un-
solved than it solves. Some of these will be discussed below.
Prior to the sale of automobiles, refrigerators, or industrial
equipment to a consumer or other user, the dealer or distributor
must acquire them from a factory and have them available on
his floor or warehouse. In the hard-goods field, particularly con-
sumer goods, factories have established a pattern of extending
no credit and requiring payment upon shipment. This throws
upon the dealer the burden of paying cash. As prices rise and
styles and models proliferate, the cash required to carry such
inventories becomes unavailable without secured financing. The
chattel mortgage is essentially unsuitable as a vehicle for this
financing, both because it provides no mechanism for avoiding
repetitious preparation of lengthy documents and repetitious
recording thereof as the inventory rapidly shifts, and also be-
cause the nineteenth century had developed rules of law casting
grave doubt on the validity of chattel mortgages on inventory.5
A practice developed of handling this kind of inventory
financing by a device borrowed from the practices of import
trade; namely, the trust receipt, the theory of which is that the
financial institution pays for the merchandise, takes title and
entrusts the merchandise to the dealer. After this device had been
extensively borrowed for use in the financing of inventories of
automobiles and similar products, the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws codified the practice into the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act6 which is in force in over thirty states, but again
the development passed Kentucky by.
Another development was the need for a financing mech-
anism for inventories of a different nature-not large discrete
4 Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act, 9B Uniform
Laws Ann. 289.
. See Sandy Valley Grocery Co. v. Patrick, 276 Ky. 768, 103 S.W.2d 307
(1937); Cohen & Gerber, "Mortgages of Merchandise," 39 Colum. L. Rev.
1338 (1939).
6 9-C Uniform Laws Ann. 231.
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units like automobiles, but inventories of raw materials and
parts going into a manufacturing process as in the textile and
machinery trades. Here the required mechanism was one by
which an aggregate inventory, shifting in its components and
also being transformed, could remain subject to a lien through-
out the process of fabrication. For this purpose, as the result of
a long history, there was developed a form of factors' lien which,
without the sponsorship of the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, met such a demand that it has been enacted in the post-
war period in over twenty states.7 Again this was a development
that by-passed Kentucky. Another development was the growth
of financing to relieve manufacturers and distributors from
pressure on their working capital, arising from the trade credit
represented by their accounts receivable. Extensive practices
of accounts-receivable financing developed, but their legal status
was put in jeopardy and rendered uncertain by decisions as to
the necessity for "notification" to the debtor that his account
had been assigned.8 These legal doubts were put at rest in over
thirty states by the enactment of accounts receivable statutes,
some of which validated the assignment without notification to
the debtor or other action, and others of which required central
filing of notice to the effect that the creditor was assigning his
receivables to a named financial institution. However, Kentucky
did not join in the adoption of such statutes.
It is wholly understandable that when Kentucky was pri-
marily an agricultural state, the pressures for modernization of
commercial law should have been less forceful than they were
in other states. It is reasonable to hazard the guess that with
the new river power developments and other foreshadowings
of industrial development in Kentucky, the demand for modern-
ization of Kentucky's chattel security law would have grown
rapidly had not the legislature wisely forestalled the demand
by enacting the Uniform Commercial Code.
Article 9 of the Code' is essentially a rationalization of the
7 See Fechteler, "The Factor's Lien Statutes," 11 Bus. Law. 60 (1956); and
list of the statutes id. at 70.8 Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
9 The Code as passed in Kentucky is Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77, Legislative Re-
search Commission, Informational Bulletin No. 24 (1959). It is based on the
1957 Official Text of the Code as published by the American Law Institute and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. References
herein to "UCC § " are to the Kentucky Code and the 1957 Official Text,
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statutory development just reviewed, and the elimination of ac-
cidental and historical discrepancies as to the coverage and scope
of the several devices mentioned. Article 9 starts with the financ-
ing of inventory; proceeds through sale or creation of a "security
interest" or lien on the goods in connection with a retail sale or
by a separate transaction in loan and "chattel mortgage" form;
and also covers the disposition of the resulting accounts receiv-
able or installment receivables in financing transactions. Article
9 thus has in itself the same unity as underlies the Uniform Com-
mercial Code as a whole; namely, the sale of goods as the prime
commercial transaction, together with the credit instruments
which are created in the processes of sale and of distribution
before and after sale.
Article 9 has a somewhat unfamiliar terminology. It uses the
term "security interest" instead of conditional sale contract,
chattel mortgage, lien, trust receipt, or other such name. It uses
the term "secured party" instead of chattel mortgagee, condi-
tional vendor, entruster, etc. It uses the term "debtor" instead
of mortgagor, conditional vendee, trustee, etc. This new termin-
ology is for the purpose of getting away from the connotations
attached to these older terms under the former separate devices,
thereby emphasizing the essential unity of chattel security de-
vices as conceived under the Code without regard to mechanism.
Once the terminology is grasped, Kentucky lawyers will have
no difficulty working with the concepts of the Code, because
they are essentially the familiar concepts of the law of security,
with changes in scope and application.
As we review the five parts into which Article 9 is divided,
it will be apparent that Article 9 is broadening and amendatory,
rather than revolutionary.
DEFiNmoNs
Part 1 is essentially a matter of definitions. It is unfortunate
that these definitions serve as the introduction to Article 9, be-
cause they seem to be complex and difficult. In fact, they are of
relatively little importance and the best thing to do is forget
unless otherwise indicated. Occasional reference will also be made to the 1958
Official Text, which contains some corrections, and the 1954 Official Text, which
was the first form of the Code and was adopted in Pennsylvania.
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about them unless and until someone has occasion to study a
definition in a context in which it might be material. For in-
stance, the term "inventory" is defined, but never used in the
substantive parts of Article 9. The distinctions between "in-
ventory" and "equipment" and "consumer goods," have some
significance for filing purposes in the provisions of the Code as
drafted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.' Since
Kentucky adopted a single uniform principle of local filing,"
these distinctions are of no importance in Kentucky for that pur-
pose. They retain only a very slight importance in the application
of the default provisions.12 The distinction between "account re-
ceivable" and "contract right'- 3 is particularly unfortunate, since
the two types of rights are treated identically except for a single
provision,14 where a distinction could have been drawn without
this complex nomenclature.
Another regrettable piece of definition is the terrifying and
abstruse concept of attachment. 4  All it means is the point at
which a security interest becomes good between the parties. So
expressed, the elements of the term are self-evident. A security
interest is good between parties when there are (1) an agree-
ment, (2) consideration, and (3) a property interest that can
be subjected to the lien. Yet the definition makes the obvious
concept look very difficult.
CREATION OF THE SECURiTY INTEREST
Part 2 of Article 9 deals with the creation of the security
interest. All formalities are eliminated, except that there must
be a written agreement, unless the security interest is created
by pledge or delivery of possession. The Code has no rules of law
based on the question when title passes, and all rules are stated
without regard to that question. This is not to say that the parties
cannot draw an agreement for non-Code purposes making a
distinction as to when title passes. If there is a local or federal tax
10 UCC, 1957 Official Text, § 9-401.
11 UCC § 9-401.
12 UCC § 9-505.
1' UCC § 9-106.
14UCC § 9-318(2).
14a UCC § 9-204(1). Subsection 9-204(2) has some formidable special rules
for attachment of security interests in crops, fish, minerals, timber, accounts and
contract rights, but no one has yet suggested any likely case where these rules
would govern a problem.
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consideration or other non-Code consideration affected by the
passage of title, the distinction can still be drawn. As far as the
Code is concerned, however, conditional sale contracts (in which
title does not pass) and chattel mortgages (in which title is
assumed to pass) are treated identically.
This leaves the drafting of forms for standard instruments
completely flexible. Every lawyer has the problems of borderline
cities like Cincinnati and Louisville which serve interstate areas,
and national companies have nationwide problems. Lawyers find
it perfectly feasible to use the same form for both a Code state
and a non-Code state like Ohio which uses principally chattel
mortgages, or both a Code state and a non-Code state like
Tennessee which uses principally conditional sale contracts.
Any form that works well under pre-existing law in any state will
work equally well under the Code. This discussion is just as ac-
curate as applied to motor vehicles, which are subject to the
Kentucky Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales Act, as it is to
other types of goods where the legal requirements as to form
are governed exclusively by the Code. For this reason the con-
tentions that have been made to the effect that rewriting of forms
under the Code is expensive are wholly without foundation.
Part 2 also contains provisions granting the utmost flexibility
as to the inclusion of future-advance clauses in the statement of
the amount secured by a security agreement, whether or not there
is a commitment to make future advances,15 and as to the in-
clusion of after-acquired property under the security agreement.16
This contrasts with former Kentucky law, which covered after-
acquired property only under provisions which referred to "tools,
machinery or farm implements . . . which may be thereafter
acquired" and to replacements of any of the mortgaged prop-
ertyYT The former Kentucky law likewise limited future advances
to those to be made within one year and not to exceed an aggre-
gate amount stated in the mortgage.'8 The breadth of the Code
provisions may seem alarming, but in themselves they occasion
very little difficulty. They simply avoid the necessity for supple-
mental mortgages, pursuant to agreement in the original mort-
'5 UCCG § 9-204(5).
15 UCC § 9-204(3). Minor exceptions appear in § 9-204(4).
17KRS § 382.610(2)(c) and (3).
l8KRS § 382.620.
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gage, and avoid extensive title searching as preludes to subse-
quent advances. They accomplish mechanical facility rather than
any innovation in the kind of financing that is possible. As will
be pointed out below, 19 the priorities problems of the Code stem
not from these broad after-acquired property and future advance
provisions, but from notice filing.
The Code also contains a provision" eliminating the rule of
Benedict v. Ratner;2' that is, the rule which required a mortgagee
of inventory or assignee of accounts receivable to exercise "do-
minion" over the proceeds as his security was transformed into
cash by the sale of inventory or collection of receivables. 22 This
rule had been recognized as to inventory in Kentucky. - The
abolition of the rule makes theoretically and practically possible
an effective security interest in a changing stock of inventory like
that of a department store. There are persons who have argued
that this provision abolishing the "dominion" rule plus the
broad future-advances and after-acquired property provisions
make possible a "floating lien" of which they are fearful. The
fears are not unreasonable, but experience to date in Pennsyl-
vania and Massachusetts has not indicated any pre-emption of
all of a debtor's potential collateral either to his detriment or to
that of his trade creditors.24
PERFECTION OF TIM SECURI INTEREST
Part 3 of Article 9 deals with the perfection of security inter-
ests and Part 4 deals with the most important method of perfec-
tion, namely, filing. The structure of Article 9 as to perfection
of security interests, a relatively new term in the law of prop-
erty, is as follows:
(a) A security interest in types of personal property which
19 See pp. 384-85 infra.
20 UCC § 9-205.
21268 U.S. 853 (1925).
22 See Cohen and Gerber, "Mortgages of Accounts Receivable," 29 Geo. L.J.
555 (1941); Cohen and Gerber, "Mortgages of Merchandise," 39 Colum. L. Rev.
1838 (1939).
23 Sandy Valley Grocery Co. v. Patrick, 276 Ky. 768, 108 S.W.2d 807 (1937).2 4 Another part of the floating lien fear rests on UCC § 9-108, which pro-
vides that security acquired under an after-acquired property clause in the
ordinary course of business shall be deemed taken for new value and not as
security for an antecedent debt. This aspect of the floating lien problem is far
less important than the provisions of the Code mentioned in the text. Indeed,
it may be questioned whether any state declaration can change the bankruptcy
standard of preference.
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are physically capable of delivery of possession may be perfected
by pledge (delivery of possession) without filing. The types of
personal property which can be pledged include all "goods" or
tangible chattels; instruments (that is, negotiable instruments
and securities); negotiable documents of title; and chattel paper
(that is, conditional sale contracts, chattel mortgages, and the
like) 25
(b) Subject to the exceptions to be mentioned in (c) and
(d) below, perfection of all other security interests requires
filing. This means that, except as stated in (c) and (d), all liens
in the nature of chattel mortgages, conditional sales, and trust
receipts must be filed. Security interests may not be perfected
by pledging a non-negotiable document of title, but, of course,
the issuance of the non-negotiable document of title in favor
of a creditor amounts, in effect, to a pledge of the goods to him,
and the warehouse man or carrier is bailee on his behalf. 26 A
security interest in chattel paper may be perfected either by
filing or by delivery of possession without filing,27 but if delivery
of the paper is not taken, any bona fide purchaser of the paper
for new value who takes possession of it in the ordinary course
of business and without knowledge of the pre-existing security
interest has priority over the security interest perfected without
filing.
28
This last set of provisions is of particular interest. As trans-
actions in automobiles and other consumer goods have multiplied,
billions of dollars of credit instruments (chattel paper) flow into
the channels of commerce every year. In most cases when the
dealer sells chattel paper to a financial institution, he delivers
the paper. It has always been thought that the paper was a
specialty, an indispensable instrument, and that passage of title
to the paper or a lien thereon was completed by the delivery of
the paper. Yet there are certain forms of financing for which de-
livery of the paper is not convenient. In the ordinary furniture
store or department-store appliance department, the contract is a
very short form written on the back of a ledger card. The store be-
lieves that it cannot physically deliver the contract. And yet
25 UCC § 9-305.
26 Ibid.
27 UCC §§ 9-304(1), 9-305.
28UCC § 9-308.
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the bank wants good security. That means that some form of
non-possessory arrangement for assignment of those contracts
is needed. Prior to the Code this simply was an insoluble prob-
lem. The Code solves it, because under the Code the assignment
of chattel paper can be perfected by filing without delivery, if
the bank is willing to take the risk of fraudulent delivery of the
paper to another assignee.
(c) There are certain special exceptions permitting perfection
without filing for temporary periods.29 These were deemed neces-
sary to facilitate import transactions and the exchange of docu-
ments for goods in documentary draft transactions, such as the
transmission of bills of lading or warehouse receipts through
banking channels accompanied by drafts. These very specialized
provisions may be disregarded by the average lawyer.
(d) In recognition of the fact that in most trading areas it
has not been customary to file or record conditional sales con-
tracts or chattel mortgages in small amounts on consumer goods,
there are provisions that filing is not necessary to perfect pur-
chase-money security interests in consumer goods other than
fixtures and motor vehicles, and in farm equipment having a
purchase price not in excess of $2,500. 0 This means that the
unfiled security interests will be good against creditors or in
bankruptcy. There remains the possibility that a consumer whose
ownership was subject to a security interest because he had
purchased on time might fraudulently sell to another consumer.
The Code provides that if such other consumer buys without
knowledge of the security interest, he takes free of it unless a
financing statement has been filed covering the security interest.3 '
It will remain for each creditor to appraise this latter risk and
determine whether in practice he will file the small consumer
items. It can well be argued that this is not a satisfactory rule
of law from the point of view of the second consumer, but there
was a problem of conflicting interests, and it was impossible to
reach a compromise solution that was satisfactory to everyone.
Motor vehicles present a special problem. The Code had to
be drafted with alternatives in recognition of the fact that some
states have, and some states do not have, certificate-of-title laws
29 UCC § 9-804(4) & (5).




controlling the title to, and the creation of liens on, motor
vehicles. At the time the Code was adopted in Kentucky, Ken-
tucky did not have such a statute, but Kentucky adopted a
statute during that session of the legislature.32
The statute is not, in the typical form of certificate-of-title
statutes. It calls, in effect, for a double form of public notice,
once by showing the lien on the registration receipt for the car
and the copy thereof in the Recorder's office, and secondly, pur-
suant to a 1960 amendment, by standard filing under the Code.
It is not integrated with the Code. In this writer's opinion, it is
not a full certificate-of-title statute and does not obviate the
necessity for normal filing under the Code.
The writer would recommend that either Kentucky adopt a
full certificate-of-title statute that would replace the normal
filing under the Code, or eliminate the requirement that the
lien be noted on the registration receipt and the copy thereof.
There is no excuse for double requirements for public notice.
Inventory presents a special problem. The Code makes pos-
sible a security interest on inventory, but, of course, it is expected
that inventory will be sold. The wheels of commerce would stop
if the purchaser of an automobile or a refrigerator in a show-
room had to check the records to see whether the dealer's stock
was subject to an inventory lien, and then make sure that the
lien was paid off before he purchased. Accordingly, even though
the security interest is perfected by filing, a buyer in the ordinary
course of business takes free of a security interest in inventory.
33
Once security interests in inventory and accounts receivable
were validated, special problems had to be faced as to the
transfer of the security interest to the proceeds when the in-
ventory is sold or the accounts receivable are collected. The
Code is the first property statute which attempts to deal com-
prehensively with that subject.34 While it would be wrong to say
that the Code solves all problems thereunder, it certainly ad-
vances the solution beyond any pre-existing state of the law.
Some of the problems involved will be discussed below.
Similarly, while the Code cannot solve the perennially trouble-
some problem as to what is a fixture, it does deal in modem
2 Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 82.
3UCC § 9-307(1).
34 Compare Uniform Trust Receipts Act, §§ 9 and 10.
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fashion with the difficult problem as to the affixation of chattels
such as furnaces, air-conditioning, etc., to real property, and
the resulting clash between persons holding security interests
in the chattels and persons claiming to be the real estate owners
or mortgagees.35 In general, the Code adopts the principle that
a chattel security interest which existed before affixation remains
valid (subject to perfection by filing, of course) and that the
chattel can be removed by the secured party subject only to
making good any damage to the real property.
For Kentucky lawyers the rules of Article 9 governing filing,
in part 4, will be surprising, because Kentucky has had no prior
experience with notice filing. The Factors' Lien Acts and the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act, both of which apply to inventory
situations, recognized the impracticability of recording or filing
every transaction involving the financing of inventory, because
shipments of inventory might be received weekly or even daily.
Accordingly, they provided, in substance, for a single filing of
notice that inventory financing transactions would take place,
without specifying the amount and without attempting a de-
tailed description of a changing stock of inventory. For similar
reasons, the statutes as to notice of accounts receivable financ-
ing also provided for central notice filing. The draftsmen of the
Code adopted this notice filing not only for recurring types of
financing such as inventory and accounts receivable, but also
for transactions which are not likely to recur regularly between
the same parties, such as an individual conditional sale contract,
a chattel mortgage executed when an automobile or other vehicle
was purchased on time or an individual chattel mortgage loan.
It should be emphasized that the original security interest
(chattel mortgage or conditional sale) need not be filed; instead,
one may file a simple notice giving bare elements: the names and
addresses of the parties and the general nature of the collateral.
On February 15, 1960, the Kentucky General Assembly passed
House Bill No. 73, which requires the financing statement for
consumer goods only to show serial numbers, if any, and for
automobiles and motor trucks to contain in addition the make,
year, model and motor number. While this makes the Code
non-uniform, as will appear below the writer cannot disagree
85 UCC § 9-318.
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with the wisdom of this in the case of individual, non-recurring
financings. Incidentally, one might question whether the legis-
lature intended to exclude from the operation of the statute
passenger automobiles, such as salesmen's and doctors' cars,
which are not strictly speaking "consumer goods."
When the draftsmen o fthe Code proposed to adapt notice
filing to individual transactions such as sale of an automobile on
time or a bank loan to a small factory on the security of its ma-
chinery, the writer raised the question whether that was a sound
extension, but was overruled. The experience in Pennsylvania,
which now has had the Code in operation for five full years, has
not borne out these original fears. There have not been in prac-
tice any of the serious conflicts which this notice filing makes
possible. Perhaps a large part of the reason that the practice
has proved better than the threat has been that many people
have not chosen to use the full freedom of action that the Code
has given them. They have chosen to file the security agree-
ment, rather than a simple notice, and they have thereby
avoided the possibility that a broad notice would create confusion.
Let us explore, however, the basis of these fears. The form of
filing is very simple and a suggested form is set forth in the
Code.36 It merely gives the names and addresses of the parties
and describes ,the type of property involved. Thus it would
appear that if an individual bought a Ford automobile from a
dealer, a financing statement would be good which described
the property involved as "automobiles" without referring either
to the make, the year, the model, or the serial number. This
could theoretically create problems, because even though the
individual had only contemplated a single purchase, a subse-
quent purchase between the same parties during the life of the
original financing statement (up to five years) would be cov-
ered by the same financing statement. Someone else might have
a financing statement also covering automobiles, either alone or
in connection with other goods. To solve resulting possibilities
of conflict, the Code has a section on conflicting security in-
terestsY Its basic rule is that if two security interests were both
perfected by filing, the first to file has priority; but in other cases
(e.g., when one was perfected by pledge) the first to perfect
36 UCC § 9-402.
37 UCC § 9-312.
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has priority. The resulting problems have been explored in a
detailed article. 38 It will be sufficient to suggest them with one
example: Suppose that Bank A lends some money to a contractor
on the security of a power shovel, but their financing statement
describes the property covered as "road-building equipment."
Later, Bank B lends some money to the same contractor on the
security of a tractor and files a financing statement describing
the tractor in detail.
Still later, Bank A wants to take a "second mortgage" on the
tractor as further security for its original loan. Both banks then
find to their surprise that since Bank A was the first to file, and
its financing statement covered "road-building equipment,"
Bank A's security interest in the tractor comes ahead of the
security interest of Bank B which was earlier in time.
It will be seen that this problem has nothing to do with
after-acquired property clauses or with future-advance clauses,
but arises solely out of the breadth of notice filing?' Bank A's
claim to the tractor might possibly arise under an after-acquired
property clause without a new security agreement; but even if
it arose under a new security agreement, it is the priority granted
to the first filing which produces this unexpected result.
Now in the hypothetical case mentioned, the writer was
careful to state that both banks were lending money-that is,
the possibility was excluded that the interest of either bank was
a "purchase money security interest,"40 because the Code largely
mitigates the consequences of a first-to-file rule with an exception
in favor of purchase money security interests.41 This was neces-
sary in order to make possible the transaction of ordinary in-
stallment sales business by dealers with purchasers, without
the dealer having to search the record to make sure that the
purchaser did not have a prior filing broad enough to cover the
kind of equipment involved.
Unfortunately, section 9-312(4) as drawn in the 1957 Official
38 Coogan, "Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among
Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien'," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 838 (1959).3 9 In the 1954 Code as adopted in Pennsylvania, this point was inadequately
realized, and the exceptions for purchase-money interests were therefore wrongly
phrased. 1954 Official Text, § 9-312(3) and (4).
40 Defined in UCC § 9-107 to include a person whose money is used to pay
a seller, as well as a seller (and his assignee).
41UCC § 9-312(3) and (4). In the case of inventory, the person doing
the purehase-money financing must also give notice of that fact to the person
with the prior filing, before the debtor receives possession of the collateral.
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Text and adopted in Kentucky is defective. It requires perfection
of the purchase money security interest before delivery of pos-
session to the equipment. We are talking about the purchase
of an automobile or a piece of equipment from a dealer. It could
happen on a Saturday or Sunday; it could happen after hours;
or after the County Clerk's office closes on a weekday. It is
simply an impossibility to hold up the delivery of a truck or
other piece of equipment that a purchaser wants, until one can
get notice on file in the local County Clerk's office. The dealer
won't wait for it; the purchaser won't wait for it. So, in re-
quiring perfection before delivery of possession, section 9-312(4)
as enacted in Kentucky contains an error of great importance.
This point was discovered when procedures were being de-
veloped for operating under the Code in Massachusetts. The
American Law Institute and the Commissioners recognized the
error, and in the 1958 supplement to their recommended Code,4
they corrected the error by changing section 9-312(4) to allow
ten days after delivery of possession within which to perfect the
purchase money security interest.43 That correction is embodied in
the law of Connecticut and New Hampshire which passed the
Code in 1959 (effective 1960). Massachusetts and Pennsylvania
have corrected it also. It is hoped that when Kentucky wrestles,
as it must, with the problem of the relation of its automobile
statute to the Code, it will also make the necessary change in
section 9-812(4).
Did we create these problems of conflicts ourselves in draft-
ing Article 9? The answer, it seems, is about half-and-half.
Partially, the problems were created by the breadth of the pro-
visions for after-acquired property, future advances, and notice
filing. These provisions make possible conflicting security in-
terests to an extent that was not heretofore possible. The other
half of the story is that when the numerous forms of chattel
security, including non-possessory forms (chattel mortgages,
conditional sales and trust receipts), a possessory form (pledge),
and drafts accompanied by bills of lading or warehouse receipts
(which are fundamentally transactions in the goods represented
by the documents), were pulled together and put side by side,
42 1958 Official Text, § 9-812(4).
43 The original Pennsylvania Code had allowed this ten days, which was
omitted by some inadvertence in the 1957 revision.
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it was realized that certain potentialities of conflict had always
existed, but somehow had never been faced. They are not of
too great importance. The mere fact that they never had to be
faced shows that they are rare. Many of the problems covered
by section 9-812(4) simply present themselves because for the
first time the Code has gathered together all the numerous areas
where chattel security could be created, and dealt with all the
problems of conflict at once.
PLAcE OF FILiNG
Some comment must now be made as to the place of filing.
The notice-filing statutes which served as the models for the
Code namely, the factors' lien acts, the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act, and the accounts receivable statutes, all contemplate filing
at a single place in the state, which is usually the Secretary
of State's office. In the drafting of the Code, the draftsmen would
have liked to follow this pattern, but met with opposition from
lawyers from the less industrialized states who were more ac-
customed to local filing, less familiar with the statutes mentioned,
and unwilling to communicate with the state capital for infor-
mation as to existing filings. The Code is therefore drafted in
alternative form to permit either central filing alone or a com-
bination of central plus local filing.44 In the two states which
acted before Kentucky, namely, Pennsylvania and Massachu-
setts, the pressures from lawyers outside the big cities caused
the legislatures to adopt the latter alternative, with the result
that double filing is required in both states, except for con-
sumers' goods where the Code contemplates only local filing.
Now something can be said for local filing and something can
be said for central filing, but certainly nothing can be said for
double filing. In Kentucky, as a relatively little-industrialized
state, it was obviously impossible to adopt central filing only, and
therefore, the Kentucky legislature wisely adopted only local
filing in a manner which conforms to past Kentucky experience.3
DEFAULT AND ENFORCEmENT
Part 5 deals with default and enforcement. Essentially, the
Code tries to get away from sterile theory. The theory of the
44 1957 Official Text, § 9-401.
45 UCC § 9-401.
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law has been that the way to protect a defaulting debtor is to
have a public sale of his automobile or other collateral. Every-
body knows in practice that public sales are usually perfunctory,
and nobody bids but the creditor. Not only that, but there never
would have been a sale if the debtor had any equity to protect;
if he had had any equity, he would have sold the goods him-
self to salvage his equity, rather than go into default, or he would
have found substitute financing.
The Code, therefore, tries to get away from the public sale
as a theoretical protection of the debtor, and recognizes the
practical fact that a public sale is almost invariably a waste of
time. It provides that all enforcement remedies of the creditor
must be "commercially reasonable." That phrase frightens some
people, but it is a phrase that the courts will read into these
transactions anyway.46
The Code permits the creditor to give the debtor notice that
he does not intend to sell the property and will keep it in satis-
faction of the debt. That is the end of the transaction unless the
debtor comes back to him and says, "No, I think I have an
equity. I want you to sell it." If the debtor so notifies, the creditor
has to hold a sale in compliance with the statute. The one
exception is a special provision (requiring sale regardless of
demand) in a purchase-money transaction involving consumer
goods where the consumer has paid sixty per cent of the cash
price.4
For the rest, the Code's enforcement provisions contain new
language breaking out of old habits of thought, but there is little
that should be unfamiliar or shocking to any American lawyer.
Som P EACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF AnTicr_ 9
This discussion will cover some of the same ground already
touched upon, but will try to make operation of Article 9 con-
crete rather than a collection of abstract rules. It will indicate
how Article 9 operates for the standard retailer, shifting from
time to time for convenience from a furniture appliance dealer
46 Cf. Commercial Credit Co. v. Cooper, 246 Ky. 513, 55 S.W.2d 381 (1933);
In re Kiamies Est., 309 N.Y. 325, 130 N.E.2d 745 (1955).
47 UCO § 9-505(2).
48UCC § 9-505(1).
[Vol. 48,
LAw oF CHATrEL SECErY
to an automobile dealer or to a department store, or at other
times to a seller of road-building equpiment.
The first problem again is inventory credit. Let us start with
a retailer of appliances, such as refrigerators. Article 9 re-enacts
inventory financing as it worked for new goods under the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act. It contemplates a very simple notice saying,
"I, the X bank, am going to do business with Y Appliance Com-
pany and finance refrigerators and other household appliances."
That is the only filing. Under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act,
it was good for a year. Under the Code, it is good for five years.
Under that simple notice, there will occur week by week a series
of transactions by which the retailer buys refrigerators and other
"white goods" from the manufacturer, and the bank or other
financial institution will pay for them, acquiring a chattel mort-
gage interest (as it has been called in Kentucky) or a security
interest (as it is called under the Code) on the goods financed.
The individual trust receipts (or security agreements as they
will be called under the Code) need not be filed. This is a great
advantage, because the financing is continuous. Under the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act, financial institutions found it in-
convenient in modem, high-speed business operations to get the
security agreements signed, especially where a bank in a city
like Louisville financed a refrigerator dealer in a small town on
weekly shipments. There was a considerable amount of experi-
menting under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act to avoid regular
signing and delivery of trust receipts. One experiment was to
permit the retailer to appoint an employee of the bank as his
agent to sign the trust receipt for him.
Under the Code, it is perfectly clear that there need be no
actual signature of individual trust receipts. Instead, a basic
underlying agreement can provide that if the bank advances the
money to pay for the refrigerators for the retailer, the bank shall
have a security interest on each item paid for. If the bank feels
uncomfortable without the dealer's signature to each individual
security agreement, it may get individually signed security agree-
ments. If it feels comfortable and is content to rely on the
underlying agreement and the proof that it paid the man-
ufacturer and that the dealer took the goods, then it need not
be bothered with the paper work (the bane of all modem
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security transactions) of getting each trust receipt separately
signed.
Refrigerators rather than automobiles were deliberately used
in the foregoing example, because automobile financing is affec-
ted by Kentucky's new statute, effective January 1, 1960,49 as
to which there is considerable difficulty in interpretation. This
statute, very briefly, provides that the registration receipt in
the possession of the owner and the copy of the receipt in the
County Clerk's office shall each have the liens recorded on it.
It is something like a certificate-of-title law, but as the writer
reads the statute, it is not a full certificate-of-title law. Section
11 of this statute added the following to Kentucky's chattel
mortgage statute:
No instrument conveying or reserving a security interest
in a motor vehicle shall be recorded unless the vehicle
has been properly registered.
What does that mean in the case of a new car in the dealer's
showroom, which has never been registered because it has never
been on the highway? It is hoped that since there is no duty to
register that car until it is on the highway, section 11 does not
apply and one can have a good security interest in it without
having the car registered. If this is the correct interpretation,
automobile floor-plan financing in Kentucky will work just as
in the foregoing refrigerator example. But if one has to have
a registration receipt on the car in order that a floor-plan lien
can be shown, then the intent of the Code to have a simple one-
time filing will have been frustrated.
A similar problem arises with demonstrator cars that the
dealer has available to show prospective purchasers. The demon-
strator ordinarily is not registered (if it is owned by the dealer-
ship and not by the salesman personally), and it operates with
dealer license plates. It is hoped that the reasoning just sug-
gested will apply equally to it.
The used automobile that the dealer has taken in trade is a
much more difficult case. The Trust Receipts Act never worked for
used cars because it contemplated purchase-money financing
only. The purchase-money concept was built into the Trust
Receipts Act to distinguish the trust receipt from the chattel
49 Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 82.
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mortgage. We are no longer making that distinction, so the simple
notice filing for floor-plan financing will work just as well under
the Code for a used piece of equipment as it will for new.
Where lien rules of automobile certificate-of-title laws are
applicable to dealers' floor plan financing, they are never suc-
cessfully reconciled in the statutes with the general rules for
perfection of liens for floor-plan financing, and Kentucky is no
exception. In the typical state, the certificate-of-title law pro-
vides that all liens must be shown on the certificate of title of a
registered motor vehicle. But most statutes make provision in
their motor vehicle registration laws that when a used car is
traded in by the original owner to a dealer, the dealer need not
get it registered in his own name. He can hold the old registra-
tion certificate endorsed in blank until he sells it to a second
purchaser, and he then completes the endorsement with the new
purchaser's name. It is understood that it is not uncommon for
dealers to "jump the title" in that fashion in Kentucky, even
without statutory authorization. But consider what this means
in terms of floor-plan financing. The car is registered. The Ken-
tucky statute says that the lien must be shown on the registra-
tion receipt and on the copy in the Clerk's office; but if the dealer
has not obtained a registration receipt in his own name, it is
obviously impossible and incongruous to show a lien against him
on a receipt which is in somebody else's name. Moreover, if it is
necessary to show each item of floor-plan financing on the reg-
istration receipt of an individual car, the purpose of the Code
to create a streamlined financing mechanism with a one-time
notice will have been frustrated.
One other point should be mentioned in connection with in-
ventory financing. In financing of road-building equipment and
similar industrial machinery, it is customary for the factories to
grant trade credit for thirty to ninety days. The equipment
manufacturers differ in that respect from the automobile and
appliance manufacturers who demand spot cash. Therefore, in
equipment floor-plan financing, the dealer may have carried his
inventory for thirty to ninety days on trade credit extended by
the manufacturer before he asks for floor-plan financing from
someone else. The Trust Receipts Act never worked for that
purpose because this was no longer financing contemporaneous
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with the purchase. Article 9 will work in this situation, because
the purchase-money concept has been removed from the inven-
tory financing mechanism.
The Code and its predecessor, the Trust Receipts Act, recog-
nize the unique character of inventory as collateral, and create
the concept of split perfection; i.e., the perfection of a lien that
is good against creditors (and therefore good against the trustee
in bankruptcy) but not good against the bona fide retail pur-
chaser. An inventory lien could not be good against retail pur-
chasers or commerce would be impossible. 0 If the creditor
loses his lien on inventory when it is sold, what happens to the
lien? The dealer is expected to pay off the debt. What if he does
not do so? The answer seems absurdly simple once it is stated:
The lien on the inventory is transferred to the "proceeds" of the
sale. It is much easier to say that than it is to work it out in
detail. Three types of problems that rise under this concept of
"proceeds" will be mentioned. The first is when the proceeds
are in cash. Obviously, one cannot trace cash in fact, but there
are rules for tracing with which we are all familiar. The drafts-
men of the Code were very fearful of difficult tracing litigation.
They tried to forestall such litigation by an arbitrary rule that
the creditor was to have a preferred security interest in the cash
that the dealer had on hand, equal to his collections for ten days
immediately preceding insolvency, less whatever part of those
ten-day collections he had already turned over.51 This rough-
and-ready rule seems to be a fair attempt to solve a difficult
problem.
The next proceeds problem concerns the trade-in. Under
Article 9, the floor-plan security interest in the original inventory
transfers to the trade-in.5 There should be no difficulty with this
rule, because under the concept of notice filing, anyone is charged
with the knowledge that the dealer may have any or all of his cars
subject to a floor-plan lien. Anyone other than a retail purchaser
must find out which inventory, new or traded-in, is subject to
liens.
The third type' of proceeds problem relates to receivables,
either open accounts receivable or installment chattel mortgages
5oUCc § 9-307(1).
5UCC § 9-806(4)(d).
52 UCC § 9-306(2).
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and conditional sales contracts, which are called "chattel paper'"
in the Code. Here the Code has two different rules. In both
cases, the floor-plan lien attaches to the proceeds in substitu-
tion for the goods sold. In the case of open accounts receivable
the proceeds lien (if covered by the filed notice) is good against
anyone else. 3 In the case of chattel paper, the Code draftsmen
made a deliberate choice of policy and provided that if someone
else gets delivery of that chattel paper and pays for it, he acquires
good title to it even though he knew that there was a proceeds
claim to it. 4 The purpose of that rule was to prevent the in-
ventory financier from pre-empting the opportunity to buy the
chattel paper, which is considered a very desirable article of
commerce. There is enough distinction between accounts re-
ceivable and chattel paper, as a practical matter, to justify this
difference in legal rule. It is all but impossible to finance in-
ventories and resulting open accounts receivable separately.
They must tie together, so the inventory financer may properly
pre-empt the accounts receivable as collateral. But inventory
financing need not be tied to the purchase of chattel paper, so
it is reasonable to provide a rule which prevents the inventory
financer from pre-empting the chattel paper as against a bona
fide purchaser of the paper who pays for it and takes delivery.
We will now illustrate a problem of conflicting inventory liens
by supposing that our retailer is a department store with an
appliance department. It is theoretically possible under the Code
to have a lien on a department store's total inventory. Suppose
a financer intends to finance the department store's purchase
of refrigerators. How does he know that he is going to get a
good lien on those refrigerators as against a prior floating lien?
He can, of course, check the records and learn whether there is
a floating lien, and let us assume that he finds one. What can he
do now? He can do one of two things. As a practical matter, he
communicates with the creditor who has the prior filing which
seems to cover refrigerators among other things and says, "Look,
you are not financing the store's refrigerator inventory, are you?
I am going to do it. Give me a letter or a subordination agree-
ment that says that you won't claim the refrigerators as against
53 Ibid.
54 UCC § 9-308. second sentence.
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me." That problem has been handled very informally in Penn-
sylvania and Massachusetts in that fashion and with perfect
satisfaction to everybody.
To give another factual example of this problem on conflict-
ing filing, one financial institution files a financing statement cov-
ering automobiles, but all it is handling are Chrysler cars. The
dealer has an International truck franchise, and the person who
is going to handle the International trucks at wholesale comes
to the first financing institution and says, "Give me a letter that
says that your claim to automobiles does not include any Inter-
national trucks." That kind of situation, also, has been handled
very easily and without difficulty.
But suppose the other financer refuses to give such a letter?
Is the person who is going to finance the refrigerators or the
International trucks helpless?
The answer lies in section 9-812(8), which states that a
purchase-money security interest in inventory will prevail despite
the general rule that the first-to-file wins, if: (1) the purchase
money financer gives notice to the financer with a prior filing
that he intends to do purchase-money financing; and (2) he
perfects his own security interest in the refrigerators by filing
before the debtor is permitted to take delivery. Now in the case
of inventory that prior filing is no problem. A continuing arrange-
ment between businessmen does not have to start before there
is an opportunity for filing.
We turn now from inventory to the second stage of the
retailer's problem, selling the goods at a retail and retaining a
security interest. Here the problems are almost always exactly
what they were pre-Code. Kentucky has a Retail Installment
Sales Act but will have no problem of integrating the Code
with it.
The filing, except for automobile problems to be discussed
below, is simple. It is exactly the same local recording with the
County Clerk that Kentucky has always had, except that no
acknowledgements are needed. The places of filing are the same.
Customary forms of retail instruments can be used, but they
can be substantially cut down if desired, because most of the
remedies are provided by the statute and need not be provided
by contract. The Code does permit a certain amount of agree-
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ment between the parties as to what is reasonable notice and a
reasonable method of sale, and some draftsmanship in those areas
may be useful.
Automobiles again involve the puzzling 1958 statute.55 This
statute provides that when a new lien on a motor vehicle is
created, the owner must deliver the registration receipt to the
chattel mortgagee; the mortgagee must take it to the clerk with
the lien instrument and the proper fees for recording in accord-
ance both with this motor vehicle registration statute and with
the. Code. That seems to mean that you must have double
filing of your motor vehicle chattel lien.
If that is what the statute means, it renders inapplicable the
provision of the Code which was designed for integration with
a full certificate-of-title statute,56 which provides in substance
that if the state has a certificate-of-title law like that of Pennsyl-
vania or Ohio, all liens are shown only on the title, and regular
local filing under the Code does not apply. Since the writer doubts
that Kentucky's registration receipt statute is a certificate-of-title
law in this sense, it does not seem that the local filing rules of
the Code are made inapplicable. Kentucky will then have double
filing.
As indicated above, a creditor willing to take the risk of loss
of lien when one consumer sells to another consumer need not
file for refrigerators and other consumer goods except automo-
biles. This conforms to a practice of not filing on a calculated
risk basis which has prevailed in the past in many areas.
The draftsmen of Article 9, many of whom were professors
of law and felt that they were representatives of consumers
against predatory financial interests, were very much worried
about the banks and other financial institutions abusing the con-
sumer. Consequently in the 1954 Code,57  adopted in Pennsyl-
vania, there is a provision designed to say that the consumer
may always assert against the bank or other third party who
purchases the chattel paper the same defenses he had against
the dealer. The writer has always contended that that provi-
sion was theoretically unsound.58 If a bank lends money to a
55 Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 82.
561957 Official Text, § 9-302(3)(b) and (4).
571954 Official Text, § 9-206(1).
58 Kripke, "Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code,' 59 Yale L. J. 1209 (1950).
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consumer with which to buy a refrigerator, the bank obviously
will not lose its money just because the consumer is not satisfied
with the refrigerator-that is not the bank's concern. It should
make no difference whether the bank gets the consumer's
obligation by buying the obligation from the dealer or by lend-
ing the money to the consumer on a direct chattel mortgage.
However, the Code as drafted drew a distinction: if the bank
lent the money directly, it was free from these merchandise
defenses, but if it bought an installment obligation from the
dealer, it was subject to them. In the 1957 Official Text and in
the Kentucky Code, that provision is dropped. Instead, there
is a provision that in every case but consumer cases, the bank
can put itself in the position of freedom from these defenses
even when it buys the paper from the dealer instead of making
a direct loan.59 The statute goes on to provide, however, that
if the state has a different rule for consumers, either by another
statute or by judicial decision, that other rule for consumers con-
tinues to apply.
The third general problem of a retailer is the disposition
of the receivables which he created in the sale of goods. These
can be open accounts receivable for thirty or ninety days, which
arise when a dealer sells merchandise under standard trade terms,
or they can be the installment obligations secured by chattel
mortgage that the Code calls "chattel paper." In both cases,
the dealer has a substantial working capital problem and he may
have to dispose of the receivables to obtain ready cash.
Accounts receivable financing can be handled on a sale or a
loan basis. The Code applies to both types of receivables financ-
ing, because the line between them is shadowy. It can be handled
on a notification or a non-notification basis so far as the purch-
aser is concerned, but in all cases the creditors are protected
by the usual notice-filing requirement. This is the kind of con-
tinuing transaction where the notice-filing under the Code is
perfectly appropriate and works very well.
In the case of chattel paper (chattel mortgages and accom-
panying notes) which are ordinarily sold by an automobile or
refrigerator dealer and delivered to the bank or finance company,
no filing is required, because the obligation is deemed to be
59 1957 Official Text, § 9-206.
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embodied in the piece of paper in the same way as the obliga-
tion of a negotiable note is embodied in the piece of paper.
Delivery perfects the assignment.6" But there are certain kinds
of transactions involving furniture or small appliance accounts
where the bank or finance company does not want to collect
the paper itself, does not want to notify the purchaser, and does
not want to take physical delivery of the vast bulk of small retail
contracts. Then filing can be used as a substitute for delivery."1
The filing will perfect the assignment of this retail paper against
everyone but a bona fide purchaser who in good faith subse-
quently takes delivery of the paper.62 That is the risk of double
financing. Double financing does not occur without fraud. Most
people are willing to take the moral risk of fraud even when
they want protection against the credit risk. But if a creditor fears
the moral risk and wants to protect against double financing,
he can very easily do so by marking the contracts to show the
assignment. It is hard to see how any subsequent potential
financer could take delivery of those contracts and claim that
it acted in good faith in buying them without seeing this notice
of assignment. Thus, the Code makes possible complete flex-
ibility of technique in receivables financing.
CONCLUSION
The over-all effect of the Codes modernization of security
devices is to simplify the problems of the retailer and other small
debtors. The pre-existing inadequate legal structure forced the
creditor to carry not only a credit risk but a legal risk, and in
the long run the retailer and the public had to pay for it. When
financing is simplified, its costs are reduced.
Representatives of unsecured creditors have argued that the
Code is unfair in shifting the balance between secured and un-
secured creditors by making secured financing too simple, but
this is unsound. Unsecured creditors have no vested interest in
the inadequacies of the law. No one has a right to say, "Well,
maybe we can get something for ourselves as general creditors
by tripping up the secured creditor and defeating his lien on
60 UCC § 9-805.
6iUCC § 9-304(1).
62 UCC § 9-308, first sentence. See also UCC § 9-309.
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some technicality." That is not the way that good law to govern
commercial transactions is made. If the law permits a lien to be
created in any area of commerce, it is to everyone's advantage
to make the securing of that lien as simple as possible. Article
9 is a great step in that direction.
